Internet Advertising and Optimal Auction Design
author: Michael Schwarz,
Yahoo! Research
published: Dec. 20, 2008, recorded: December 2008, views: 4123
published: Dec. 20, 2008, recorded: December 2008, views: 4123
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Description
This talk describes the optimal (revenue maximizing) auction for sponsored search advertising. We show that a search engine's optimal reserve price is independent of the number of bidders. Using simulations, we consider the changes that result from a search engine's choice of reserve price and from changes in the number of participating advertisers.
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