Internet Advertising and Optimal Auction Design
author: Michael Schwarz,
Yahoo! Research
published: Sept. 29, 2008, recorded: August 2008, views: 4777
published: Sept. 29, 2008, recorded: August 2008, views: 4777
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Description
We characterize the optimal (revenue maximizing) auction for sponsored search advertising. We show that a search engine's optimal reserve price is independent of the number of bidders. Using simulations, we consider the changes that result from a search engine's choice of reserve price and from changes in the number of participating advertisers.
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