Secure Vehicle Communication



SeVeCom : Secure Vehicle Communication

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


















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


















SE-cure VE-hicle COM-munication

Mission: future-proof solution to the problem of V2V/V2I security

TRUALOG

DAIMLERCHRYSLER

- Partners
 - Trialog (Coordinator)
 - DaimlerChrysler
 - Centro Ricerche Fiat
 - Bosch
 - KU Leuven



- Ecole Polytechnique Fédéral de Lausanne
- University of Ulm


BOSCH

SEVEL



SEVECOM is a Transversal Project









	Торіс	Scope of work
A1	Key and identity management	Fully addressed
A2	Secure communication protocols (inc. secure routing)	Fully addressed
A3	Tamper proof device and decision on cryptosystem	Fully addressed
A4	Vehicle Intrusion	Investigation work
A5	Mulfunction detection and Data consistency	Investigation work
A 6	Privacy	Fully addressed
A7	Secure positioning	Investigation work
A 8	Secure user interface	Investigation work



Objectives

- Focus on communication
- Baseline Privacy Enhancing Technology (PET)
- Future dynamic deployment of stronger PETs
 - Analogy: switching from 8 to 10 digit telephone numbers

Baseline solution design approach


- Standardized cryptographic primitives
- Easy-to-implement
- Low overhead
- Adaptable protection


Security Baseline Architecture (cont'd)




Challenges

- High rate broadcast communication
- VANET-only (e.g., safety) and TCP/IP communication






Building Blocks in Baseline Architecture **SEVECOM**



Deployment









Requirements

- Authentication, Integrity, Non-repudiation, Access control, Confidentiality
- Availability
- Privacy
 - Liability identification


Sevecom Privacy focus

- V2V / V2I communication
 - should not make it easier to identify or track vehicles
 - should conform to future privacy directives
- Lack of privacy control will prevent deployment
 - Active safety applications require knowledge on activities of nearby vehicles, not their identity
 - Similar requirements to electronic payment
 - Privacy-enhancement mechanisms that use resolvable pseudonyms










Security Baseline Architecture (cont'd)





- **Pseudonym**: Remove all identifying information from certificate
- Equip vehicles with multiple pseudonyms
 - Alternate among pseudonyms over time (and space)
 - Sign message with the private key corresponding to pseudonym
 - Append current pseudonym to signed message



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Secure Vehicle Communication





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