



Protection




- 1) authentication
- 2) authorization
- 3) confidentiality

Crypto



Shared key (DES)
 $k_1 = k_2$

Public key (RSA)
 $k_1 \neq k_2$

Security Primitives 

- sign, verify
- encrypt, decrypt

Pub. Key

A \rightarrow B

$\{m\}^{k_{Apriv}}$
sign


$\{m\}^{k_{Bpub}}$
encrypt

hard to
build

Authentication

- 1) Who is requesting?
(same principal as before)
- 2) Mesg that was sent = mesg recv.

Model



authentication ← technical




name



trust ← psychological




Integrity \neq Authenticity \neq Confidentiality



“Donate \$100 to Save the Whales.”

- One time pad \rightarrow no! \hookrightarrow checksum dependent on key
- CRC



$k_1 \neq k_2 \rightarrow$ MAC

$k_1 = k_2 \rightarrow$ signature

$\{ \text{hash}(m) \}_{k_{A\text{priv}}}$

Cryptographically
secure
 sha-1)

Key Distribution Problem

A → B “A’s pub key is X”

certificates

CA – certificate authority

Secure Comm. Channel

Use pub. key to authenticate

Exchange a shared key

Properties of crypt. Protocols

- 1) freshness
- 2) appropriate
- 3) forward secrecy

Attacks

crypto

replay

impersonation