Broken symmetries in financial markets

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Phenomenology

Exchange goods without a market

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Phenomenology

Exchange goods without a market

- Find something to buy/sell
- Find somebody interested
- Think of a fair price
- Agree on a price
- Exchange goods

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Phenomenology

Internet era

- Find something to sell/buy
- Go to auction site
- Auctioneers determine price
- Goods travel by post

MARKET!!!!

The more bidders, the better the price

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Phenomenology

Role of financial markets

Centralised markets

- Exchange goods
- Speed
- Good prices
- Low transaction costs
- The more traders, the better the prices

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Phenomenology

Financial markets

Real goods:

- Stocks
- Commodities (oil, gold, ...)
- Foreign exchange

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Phenomenology

Financial markets

Real goods:

- Stocks
- Commodities (oil, gold, ...)
- Foreign exchange

Risk-related goods:

- Bonds
- Futures
- Options
- Insurance
- Structured products
- . . .


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Phenomenology

Double auction

eBay²

- One item
- Several buyers: bids
- Several sellers: asks



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Phenomenology

1 year = 1 Tb of data

- Daily CERN-like experiment
- Much noise
- What to measure?
- How many computers?

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Symmetries

- buy \equiv sell
- buy,sell \equiv sell/buy
- Efficient markets
 - E[p(t+1)] = p(t)
 - $r_{\tau}(t) = \log p(t + \tau) \log p(t)$: price return

$$E[r(t)r(t+T)]=0$$

(necessary condition)

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Why symmetry in markets?

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Why symmetry in markets?

Because markets hate asymmetry

Any asymmetry is detected and corrected

 $\text{Quality} \rightarrow \text{reputation}$

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Modelling

Simplest

- Bachelier: Gaussian uncorrelated random walk
- Mandelbrodt: Levy uncorrelated random walk
- Now: power-law random walks with long memory (stay awake)

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Typical agent-based model

- N agents
- $S_i(t)$ state of agent $i \in \{-1, 0, 1\}$
- $S_i(t+1) = \operatorname{sign}[\sum_j J_{i,j}S_j(t) + h_iS_i(t) + F]$
- $\log p(t+1) = \log p(t) + \sum_i S_i(t)$

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Buy/sell

Long position

- Time *t*, buy *N* shares
- Time t', sell N shares
- Capital gain:

$$N[p(t'+1) - p(t+1)] - T(N)$$

where T(N) transaction costs

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Buy/sell

Long position

- Time t, buy N shares
- Time t', sell N shares
- Capital gain:

$$N[p(t'+1) - p(t+1)] - T(N)$$

where T(N) transaction costs

Short position

- Time t, sell N shares
- Time t', buy N shares
- Capital gain:

$$-N[p(t'+1)-p(t+1)] - T(N)$$

where T(N) transaction costs Broken symmetries: T(N), maximum gain

Limit/market order

- Market order: BUY NOW!
- Limit order: buy at price p

Bouchaud et al:

- Cost limit order = Cost market order e
- Cost limit order < Cost market order

electronic markets markets w/ human

Microscopic asymmetry

- More buy limit orders than sell orders
- Limit order markets have a long memory:

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Microscopic asymmetry

- More buy limit orders than sell orders
- Limit order markets have a long memory:
 - Buy 100, Sell 100 NOT \equiv Sell 100, Buy 100

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Microscopic asymmetry

- More buy limit orders than sell orders
- Limit order markets have a long memory:
 - Buy 100, Sell 100 NOT \equiv Sell 100, Buy 100
 - Buy 100, Buy 10 NOT \equiv Buy 10, Buy 100


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Winning ratios

Measures of success:

- % of successful trades
- won/(won + lost)

Distribution of gains (trend followers) (Bouchaud Potters):



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Heterogeneity

- information cost
- trading frequency
- wealth
- risk profile
- annual turnover

trading frequency \leftrightarrow wealth, risk profile, turnover

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Asymmetric information

information cost \rightarrow heterogeneity

- processing power
- sources of information
- education
- honesty (insider information)

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(In-)efficient markets

- E[r(t)] = 0 TRUE
- $E[r(t) T|X] \neq 0$?
- What is X?
- How many of them?

Symmetry breaking, phase transition:

$$H = \sum_{X} E[r(t) - T|X]^2 > 0$$

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H in real markets?

- H > 0 ALWAYS
- Risk?
- $\frac{H}{(\delta H)^2}$ significant?
- *H* > 0 stabilizing?

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Agent-based models

Usual aim: reproduce market behavior

Most important ingredient


- predictability H
- central to real life
- how does it disappear?

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Trading frequency

- Who knows more about the market?
- Information spread?




Time reversal asymmetry

$$X(p(t)) = X(p(-t))$$

- Humans not time reversal
- News not time reversal
- Markets?
 - who cares?

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Measures of time reversal asymmetry




- Visually: Omori law
- autocorrelation
 NO
- asymmetry past/future.

Zumbach volatility asymmetry

- price returns noisy
- most likely asymmetric
- Historical volatility over *T* units of time of *τ* seconds:
 σ_h(*T*, *τ*)
- Realized volatility over *T* units of time of *τ* seconds:
 σ_r(*T*, *τ*)

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


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The mathematics of time reversal asymmetry

- 100s of models
- Only models with heterogeneous time scales OK

$$\sigma = \sum_{n} 2^{-\alpha n} \sigma_h(T_0 2^n, \tau)$$

- Information flows between time scales
- Put by hand

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New route: Baldovin and Stella

Unit of time
$$au = 1$$

$$r_{t,T} = \ln p(t+T) - \ln p(t)$$

• $t \neq t'$

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$$E(r_{t,1}, r_{t',1}) = 0$$

(no linear arbitrage)

• price follows random walk

$$E[r^2] \propto T^{2D}$$

$$P_T(r) = \frac{1}{T^D}g\left(\frac{r}{T^D}\right)$$

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"Renormalisation": $\overline{T} \rightarrow 2T$

$$P_{2T}(r) = \frac{1}{2^D} P_T\left(\frac{r}{2^D}\right)$$

• $r = r_1 + r_2$

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$$P_{2T}(r) = \int dr_1 dr_2 \ p_{2T}^{(2)}(r_1, r_2) \delta(r - r_1 - r_2)$$

$$P_T(r_1) = \int dr_2 \ p_{2T}^{(2)}(r_1, r_2)$$

$$P_T(r_2) = \int dr_1 \ p_{2T}^{(2)}(r_1, r_2)$$

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Consequences

Scaling:

$$E[(r_1 + r_2)^2] = E[(r_1)^2] + E[(r_2)^2]$$
$$(2T)^{2D} = 2(T^{2D})$$

$$\rightarrow D = 1/2$$

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Consequences 2

Characteristic function

$$\tilde{p}_{2T}^{(2)}(k_1,k_2) \leftrightarrow p_{2T}^{(2)}(r_1,r_2)$$

$$P_{2T}(r) = \int dr_1 dr_2 \ p_{2T}^{(2)}(r_1, r_2) \delta(r - r_1 - r_2)$$

$$\tilde{p}_{2T}^{(2)}(k, k) = \tilde{g}(\sqrt{2T}k)$$

$$P_T(r_1) = \int dr_2 \ p_{2T}^{(2)}(r_1, r_2)$$

$$\tilde{p}_{2T}^{(2)}(k, 0) = \tilde{g}(\sqrt{T}k)$$

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Consequences 2

$$ilde{
ho}_{2T}^{(2)}(k_1,k_2)= ilde{g}\left(\sqrt{Tk_1^2+Tk_2^2}
ight)$$

- Kind of multiplication in characteristic function space
- Sqrt introduces a dependency between *r*₁ and *r*₂.
- Generalisation to *n* returns:

$$ilde{p}_{2T}^{(2)}(k_1,\cdots,k_n) = ilde{g}\left(\sqrt{Tk_1^2+\cdots+Tk_n^2}\right)$$


→ Multivariate distribution from univariate distribution

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Problems

- Constant volatility
- Time reversal invariant

Solution: dilute time so that $E[r^2(t)r(t+ au)^2] \propto au^{-0.2}$




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Asymmetry of time

(with P.P. Peirano)

Omori's Law




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Symmetric asymmetry of time

Zumbach-Lynch mugshot: B-S and USD/CHF (from ZL)



Visible time scale No information cascade between time scales External shocks only

Conclusions

- Markets are asymmetric
- Time reversal invariance breaking sorts out models
- Time scales: crucial ingredient
- Time scales and efficiency: open problem

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