

An Introduction to Causal Inference in Neuroimaging

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MAX-PLANCK-GESELLSCHAFT



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→The aim of causal inference is to predict how a system reacts to an intervention.

The potential outcomes framework

(Holland PW, Statistics and Causal Inference. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1986)

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- u : An individual patient
- $S(u)$: Assignment of patient u to treatment- or control-group
- $Y(u, S(u))$: The survival time of patient u under treatment $S(u)$

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If $Y \perp\!\!\!\perp S$, i.e. if treatment assignments are done *randomly*.

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
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
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
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
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
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 - ▶ It performs well on finite data.

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- 4 Non-Linear Non-Gaussian Acyclic Models (Non-LiNGAM)
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
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
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
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
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
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- If $\sigma^2(y[t]|y[t-1], x[t-1]) < \sigma^2(y[t]|y[t-1])$ conclude that $x \rightarrow y$.

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
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


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


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
→ Control for \bar{h} : $\sigma^2(y|\bar{y}, \bar{x}, \bar{h}) < \sigma^2(y|\bar{y}, \bar{h})!$

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\rightarrow Control for \bar{h} : $\sigma^2(y|\bar{y}, \bar{x}, \bar{h}) < \sigma^2(y|\bar{y}, \bar{h})$! Impossible for latent variables.

(Granger C.W.J., Investigating causal relations by econometric models and cross-spectral methods. *Econometrica*, 1969)

Granger causality: Directed transfer function (DTF)

(Kaminski et al., Evaluating causal relations in neural systems. *Biological Cybernetics*, 2001)

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
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- $h_{ij}(f)$ describes the frequency-specific effect of $x_j[t]$ on $x_i[t]$.

Granger causality: Case study



(Bosman et al., Attentional stimulus selection through selective synchronization between monkey visual areas. *Neuron*, 2012)

Causal inference in neuroimaging

	GC	CBN	DCM	Non-LiNGAM
Provably correct under reasonable assumptions				
Testable interventions				
Hidden confounders				
Empirical performance				

Causal inference in neuroimaging

	GC	CBN	DCM	Non-LiNGAM
Provably correct under reasonable assumptions	X			
Testable interventions				
Hidden confounders				
Empirical performance				

Causal inference in neuroimaging

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Empirical performance				


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Empirical performance				

- 1 Granger Causality
- 2 Causal Bayesian Networks**
- 3 Dynamic Causal Modelling
- 4 Non-Linear Non-Gaussian Acyclic Models (Non-LiNGAM)
- 5 Summary

Causal Bayesian Networks: Introductory example

Causal structure
(unknown)




(Pearl J., *Causality: Models, reasoning, and inference*, 2000)

Causal Bayesian Networks: Introductory example


Causal structure
(unknown)

Empirical data
(observable)



Causal Bayesian Networks: Introductory example

Causal structure
(unknown)




Empirical data
(observable)

$\{x_1, y_1, z_1\}$
 $\{x_2, y_2, z_2\}$
 \vdots
 $\{x_N, y_N, z_N\}$

Causal Bayesian Networks: Introductory example

Causal structure
(unknown)




Empirical data
(observable)

$\{x_1, y_1, z_1\}$
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 $\rightarrow p(x, y, z)$

Causal Bayesian Networks: Introductory example


Causal structure
(unkown)



Empirical data
(observable)


$\{x_1, y_1, z_1\}$
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Dependency structure
(inferable)




Causal Bayesian Networks: Introductory example

Causal
structure




Dependency
structure




Causal Bayesian Networks: Introductory example


Causal
structure



Dependency
structure




Causal Bayesian Networks: Introductory example




(Pearl J., *Causality: Models, reasoning, and inference*, 2000)

Causal Bayesian Networks: Introductory example

Causal structure



Dependency structure




Causal Bayesian Networks: Potential causation

Under the assumptions of *faithfulness* and *causal sufficiency*, the following conditions are sufficient for x to be a cause of y :


- $x \not\perp\!\!\!\perp z$
- $y \not\perp\!\!\!\perp z$
- $x \perp\!\!\!\perp y$

Dependency structure



\Rightarrow

Causal structure




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
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Dependency structure



\Leftrightarrow

Causal structure




Causal Bayesian Networks: Spurious association

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
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Dependency structure



\Rightarrow

Causal structure




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
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Dependency structure



Causal structure




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
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Dependency structure




Causal structure



Causal Bayesian Networks: Genuine causation

Under the assumption of *faithfulness*, the following conditions are sufficient for x to be a genuine cause of y :

- z is a potential cause of x
- $z \not\perp\!\!\!\perp y$
- $z \perp\!\!\!\perp y|x$




(Pearl J., *Causality: Models, reasoning, and inference*, 2000)

Causal Bayesian Networks: Predicting interventions

Given: Causal structure (DAG) & $p(x, y, z, w)$

Goal: Predict the effect of experimentally controlling x




Causal Bayesian Networks: Predicting interventions

Given: Causal structure (DAG) & $p(x, y, z, w)$

Goal: Predict the effect of experimentally controlling x

- 1 Factorize $p(x, y, z, w)$ according to it's DAG:




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Causal Bayesian Networks: Predicting interventions


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
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
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
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
$$p(w | \text{do}(x = \tilde{x})) = \int_z \int_y p(w|z)p(z|\tilde{x}, y)p(y)dydz$$

Faithfulness: All observed (conditional) independences are *structural*.

Causal Bayesian Networks: Faithfulness

Faithfulness: All observed (conditional) independences are *structural*.

Causal structure




Functional model

$$\begin{aligned}x &= u_x \\ y &= ax + bz + u_y\end{aligned}$$

$$z = cx + u_z$$


Dependency structure



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
Causal structure



Functional model

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
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
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For a given causal structure (DAG), the unfaithful distributions have measure zero in the space of all distributions that can be generated by the DAG (Meek. *UAI*, 1995).

Causal Bayesian Networks: Conditional independence tests

(Pearl J., *Causality: Models, reasoning, and inference*, 2000)

- Independence tests have to be carried out on finite data.

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- Not finding a dependence is not evidence for independence.

Causal Bayesian Networks: Case study


What are the causes of inter-subject variations in performance when operating a sensorimotor brain-computer interface (BCI)?

(Grosse-Wentrup et al. Causal influence of gamma-oscillations on the sensorimotor-rhythm. *NeuroImage*, 2011)

Causal Bayesian Networks: Case study

What are the causes of inter-subject variations in performance when operating a sensorimotor brain-computer interface (BCI)?

Causal hypothesis




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
Empirical independence structure

\perp / p	Instruction	SMR	γ -power
Instruction	-	1e-4	0.44
SMR	\perp	-	2e-4
γ -power	\perp	\perp	-

Causal Bayesian Networks: Case study


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Empirical performance		X		

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Dynamic causal modelling (DCM)

Causality in DCM is used in a control theory sense and means that, under the model, activity in one brain area causes dynamics in another, and that these dynamics cause the observations. (Friston, 2009)

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
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
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Dynamic causal modelling: The hemodynamic model




(Friston K.J. et al., Dynamic causal modelling. *NeuroImage*, 2003)

Dynamic causal modelling: The bilinear model




(Friston K.J. et al., Dynamic causal modelling. *NeuroImage*, 2003)

Dynamic causal modelling: Model comparison



vs.



(Friston K.J. et al., Dynamic causal modelling. *NeuroImage*, 2003)

Inference procedure:

- 1 Observe an N -dimensional time-series $\mathbf{x}(t) \in \mathbb{R}^N$ for $t = 1, \dots, T$ (e.g., BOLD signals).
- 2 Define a set of M models $\mathcal{M} = \{m_1, \dots, m_M\}$, where each model consists of a set of differential equations with a different connectivity structure.
- 3 Fit each model to the data (which is a tough problem).
- 4 Take the connectivity of the model with the best data fit as the true causal structure.

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
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- 4 Take the connectivity of the model with the best data fit as the true causal structure.

If \mathcal{M} does not contain the true model, is the best-fitting model in \mathcal{M} similar to the true one in terms of its connectivity structure?

Dynamic causal modelling: Model fit & structure similarity


(Lohmann et al., Critical comments on dynamic causal modelling. *NeuroImage*, 2012)

Dynamic causal modelling: Model fit & structure similarity




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Dynamic causal modelling: Model fit & structure similarity



→ Similarity in terms of model fit does not translate into similarity in terms of connectivity structure.

Dynamic causal modelling: Model fit & structure similarity



→ Similarity in terms of model fit does not translate into similarity in terms of connectivity structure.

→ There is no reason to believe that DCM selects a causal structure that is structurally similar to the true one.

(Lohmann et al., Critical comments on dynamic causal modelling. *NeuroImage*, 2012)

Causal inference in neuroimaging

	GC	CBN	DCM	Non-LiNGAM
Provably correct under reasonable assumptions	X	✓		
Testable interventions	✓	✓		
Hidden confounders	X	✓		
Empirical performance		X		

Causal inference in neuroimaging

	GC	CBN	DCM	Non-LiNGAM
Provably correct under reasonable assumptions	X	✓	X	
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Empirical performance		X		

Causal inference in neuroimaging



	GC	CBN	DCM	Non-LiNGAM
Provably correct under reasonable assumptions	X	✓	X	
Testable interventions	✓	✓	X	
Hidden confounders	X	✓	X	
Empirical performance		X		

Causal inference in neuroimaging

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Provably correct under reasonable assumptions	X	✓	X	
Testable interventions	✓	✓	X	
Hidden confounders	X	✓	X	
Empirical performance		X	X	


- 1 Granger Causality
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- 4 Non-Linear Non-Gaussian Acyclic Models (Non-LiNGAM)**
- 5 Summary

Non-Linear Non-Gaussian Acyclic Models (Non-LiNGAM)




(Hoyer et al., Nonlinear causal discovery with additive noise models. *NIPS*, 2008)

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


Let

$$y = f(x) + n$$

for some arbitrary non-linear function f and $p(x, n) = p(x)p(n)$ ($x \perp n$).

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
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Is it possible to invert this model to obtain

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with some arbitrary non-linear function g and $p(y, \tilde{n}) = p(y)p(\tilde{n})$ ($y \perp \tilde{n}$)?
→ In general, no!

Inference procedure:

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- 1 Observe N samples of $\{x_i, y_i\}$ with $i = 1, \dots, N$.
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- 4 If $e_y \perp\!\!\!\perp x$ decide that $x \rightarrow y$.
- 5 If $e_x \perp\!\!\!\perp y$ decide that $y \rightarrow x$.
- 6 Do not decide on causal direction if neither $e_y \perp\!\!\!\perp x$ nor $e_x \perp\!\!\!\perp y$.

Causal inference in neuroimaging

	GC	CBN	DCM	Non-LiNGAM
Provably correct under reasonable assumptions	X	✓	X	
Testable interventions	✓	✓	X	
Hidden confounders	X	✓	X	
Empirical performance		X	X	

Causal inference in neuroimaging

	GC	CBN	DCM	Non-LiNGAM
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Testable interventions	✓	✓	X	
Hidden confounders	X	✓	X	
Empirical performance		X	X	

Causal inference in neuroimaging


	GC	CBN	DCM	Non-LiNGAM
Provably correct under reasonable assumptions	✗	✓	✗	✓
Testable interventions	✓	✓	✗	✓
Hidden confounders	✗	✓	✗	
Empirical performance		✗	✗	

Causal inference in neuroimaging

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Provably correct under reasonable assumptions	✗	✓	✗	✓
Testable interventions	✓	✓	✗	✓
Hidden confounders	✗	✓	✗	✓
Empirical performance		✗	✗	

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Empirical Performance



(Smith et al., Network modelling methods for fMRI. *NeuroImage*, 2011)

Causal inference in neuroimaging

	GC	CBN	DCM	Non-LiNGAM
Provably correct under reasonable assumptions	X	✓	X	✓
Testable interventions	✓	✓	X	✓
Hidden confounders	X	✓	X	✓
Empirical performance			X	

Causal inference in neuroimaging

	GC	CBN	DCM	Non-LiNGAM
Provably correct under reasonable assumptions	✗	✓	✗	✓
Testable interventions	✓	✓	✗	✓
Hidden confounders	✗	✓	✗	✓
Empirical performance	✗	✗	✗	✗

Conclusions

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- Every causal inference algorithms rests on *untestable* assumptions.
- Several causal inference algorithms appear to perform *above chance-level*.
- Causal inference may be useful
 - ▶ to guide the design of interventional studies
 - ▶ when qualitative conclusions do not depend on individual results.
- Causal inference is (at present) not useful, when qualitative conclusions depend on one individual inference result.

4th Int. Workshop on Pattern Recognition in Neuroimaging (PRNI 2014)



June 4-6, 2014, Tübingen
<http://prni.org>