Lecture 4 - Best responses in soccer and business partnerships
recorded by: Yale University
published: Nov. 15, 2010, recorded: September 2007, views: 3958
released under terms of: Creative Commons Attribution No Derivatives (CC-BY-ND)
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Description
We continue the idea (from last time) of playing a best response to what we believe others will do. More particularly, we develop the idea that you should not play a strategy that is not a best response for any belief about others' choices. We use this idea to analyze taking a penalty kick in soccer. Then we use it to analyze a profit-sharing partnership. Toward the end, we introduce a new notion: Nash Equilibrium.
Reading assignment:
Strategies and Games: Theory And Practice. (Dutta): Chapter 5
Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory. (Watson): Chapters 6-9
Thinking Strategically. (Dixit and Nalebuff): Chapter 3, Sections 4-6
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