Filozofom, ki izhajajo iz trdega determinizma (redukcija višjih procesov na nižje), se kaže avtonomija posameznikov kot problematična. Svobodno voljo problematizirajo, ker smo ljudje fizična, biološka ali nezavedno kognitivna bitja in je vse naše zavestno odločanje zato določeno s fizikalnimi, biološkimi in/ali kognitivnimi zakonitostmi. V pričujočem razmišljanju skušamo trdi determinizem dopolniti s konceptom emergence (oblikovanje novih kvalitet iz naključnih interakcij kolektivitet sestavnih delov). Na ta način se nam kaže delovanje v svetu kot dvojno: tako določeno kot naključno. Po našem mišljenju je smiselno avtonomijo posameznikov opazovati le na najvišji, kognitivni ravni sveta, v interakciji semiavtonomnih posameznikov in socialnega ozadja. V analizi primerjamo dve idealno tipski socialni situaciji, ki sta relevantni za razmišljanje o avtonomiji: ko ozadje pretirano strukturira posameznikovo delovanje in ko se posameznik od ozadja pretirano osvobodi.

For philosophers who are hard deterministis (reducing all higher level processes to lower ones), autonomy of individuals appears problematic. They question free will because people are physical, biological or unconscious cognitive beings and all their conscious decisionmaking is as a result determined by physical, biological and/or cognitive laws. This analysis attempts to surpass the principle of reduction of hard determinism by supplementing it with the concept of emergence (new qualities emerge from contingent interactions of collectivities of component particles). In this fashion, the world appears as dual: as determined and contingent. The author is convinced that it only makes sense to observe human autonomy from the perspective of semi-autonomous individuals interacting with social background. Two ideal type social situations are relevant for our reflection of autonomy: when background excessively structures individual activity and when individual activity is excessively emancipated from background.