Five Reasons Not to Personify AI

author: Joanna J. Bryson, Department of Computer Science, University of Bath
published: July 24, 2017,   recorded: May 2017,   views: 1014
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just a special case of computation being commodified, which is to say that the means by which AI is changing society are not trivial, but are less transparent than simple opposition. Intelligence is the triggering of appropriate actions in response to perceived events. Information technology has been allowing humans to enhance our capacity to do this arguably for thousands of years. It allows us to both remember and perceive more than we could as individuals, which in turn allows us to innovate at cooperate in unprecedented ways, sometimes at the expense of each other, other groups or the rest of the ecosystem. In this talk I establish a clear, science-based, functionalist definition of intelligence, and artificial intelligence, demonstrating from this that concerns about artificial general intelligence and superintelligence are misguided, though in different ways. Then I will talk about efforts to regulate AI, with a focus on the British efforts going back six years now with the Principles of Robotics. Finally I will address why we should not construct AI to be legal or moral agents – not because such construction is impossible, but because it is ill advised and easily avoided, at least for commercial products

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